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RECENT CASES
Army and Navy-Civil Court's Refusal to Review Double
Jeopardy Question in Court Martial-Petitioner, a naval officer, was
convicted of murder by a general court-martial and acquitted of assault
with intent to commit murder on the same victim. The Judge Advocate
General reversed the murder conviction for lack of jurisdiction.' A second
court-martial then convicted petitioner of voluntary manslaughter-, overruling his plea of former jeopardy based on the earlier acquittal of assault
with intent to commit murder. The Judge Advocate General confirmed
the judgment. In habeas corpus proceedings, the district court refused
to consider the ruling on the plea, holding that errors of law by a courtmartial are not reviewable by civil courts unless amounting to a denial of
the basic doctrine of fairness under the due process clause. In re Wrublewski, 71 F. Supp. 143 (N. D. Cal. 1947).
Since civil courts will not review the proceedings of courts-martial
unless the military court lacked jurisdiction, determination of the jurisdictional question must precede the civil court's collateral attack upon other
phases. 2 Thus a court-martial, having jurisdiction initially, may forfeit it
on the broad ground that the accused was deprived of the basic fairness
underlying the due process clause of the Constitution, 3 as where the accused was denied counsel,4 or there was a gross accumulation of prejudicial
errors.5 Those properly under military jurisdiction are specifically excepted by the Fifth Amendment from the right to grand jury indictment.,
The clause providing this exception is relied upon in the instant case
further to except military personnel from the protection against double
jeopardy. The court's authority for this extension is broad language in
cases where the applicability of the double jeopardy clause was not in
issue. 7 Observing that all of the Fifth Amendment "relating to criminal
1. Naval courts-martial have jurisdiction of the crime of murder only when com-

mitted outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. 12

STAT. 602 (1862),
34 U. S. C. § 1200, art. 6 (1940).
2. E. g., Collins v. McDonald, 258 U. S. 416 (1922) ;Mullan v. United States, 212
U. S. 516, 520 (1909) ; Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U. S. 109 (1895) ; Ex Parte Mason, 105
U. S. 696 (1881).
3. United States ex rel. Innes v. Hiatt, 141 F. 2d 664, 666 (C' C. A. 3rd 1944).
4. Shapiro v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 205 (Ct. Cl. 1947). This was not a
habeas corpus proceeding; nevertheless, the court assumed that it had the power to
review, provided that the court-martial's findings were void. The findings of a courtmartial which for any reason lacks jurisdiction are void, not voidable. See, e. g.,
Keyes v. United States, 109 U. S. 436, 440 (1883). But if counsel is provided, the
mere subsequent contention of accused that counsel was incompetent is not of itself
sufficient to make out a denial of due process. Ex Parte Benton, 63 F. Supp. 808, 810
(N. D. Cal. 1943).
5. Hicks v. Hiatt, 64 F. Supp. 238 (M. D. Pa. 1946). Cf. Schita v. King, 133 F.
2d 283 (C. C. A. 8th 1943), cert. denied, sub norn. Schita v. Pescor, 322 U. S. 750
(1944).
6. U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. V. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S.1, 40 (1942), construing
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments together; see Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (U. S.
1866).
7. The court cites Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1 (1942) (right to jury trial) ; Ex
parte Milligan, 4 Wall, 2 (U. S. 1866) (right to jury trial) ; United States ex rel.
Innes v. Crystal, 131 F. 2d 576 (C. C. A. 2d 1943) (military counsel transferred for
duty in course of trial) ; Ex parte Benton, 63 F. Supp. 808 (N. D. Cal. 1943) (incompetent counsel).
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prosecutions" is inapplicable to courts-martial, 8 the court curiously then
bases its refusal to review the findings on the due process clause of the
same amendment, on the grounds that under the fairness doctrine the
latter clause has not been violated.9
The decision as to the double jeopardy clause is contrary to the plain
language of the Fifth Amendment, 10 and is unnecessary to the result"
toward which the court was impelled by the record presented by the
petition. 12 Observing that there are different kinds of double jeopardy,
the Supreme Court has held that a mere fact situation suggesting the
label "double jeopardy" may be insufficient to demand judicial deference
to the plea.13 It has been suggested that in certain fact situations a
different label, "one continuing jeopardy," should be applied. 14 The extension, in the instant case, of the clause excepting military personnel from
grand jury protection, can lead, in a clear-cut double-jeopardy situation
bestirring judicial sympathy, only to further distortions of logic or, improvidently, to a flat prohibition against the federal courts' review of
the question of double jeopardy in all courts-martial.' 5 Since the Supreme
Court has not prescribed the extent to which each provision of the Bill
of Rights applies to courts-martial, the proper determination of the applicability of the double jeopardy clause must await an express ruling.
A just result, however, will only be available upon the recognition that
the holding in the instant case is based on inappropriate dicta.
8. Instant case at 144.
9. For those in military service military law is due process. Reaves v. Ainsworth,
219 U. S. 296, 304 (1911) ; United States v. Weeks, 259 U. S.336, 344 (1922). "But
the due process clause guarantees to them that this military procedure will be applied
to them in a fundamentally fair way." United States v. Hiatt, 141 F. 2d 664, 666 (C.
C. A. 3rd 1944).
10. See Sanford v. Robbins, 115 F. 2d 435, 438 (C. C. A. 5th 1940). "We have
no doubt that the provision of the Fifth Amendment, 'nor shall any person . . . be
twice put in jeopardy . . .' is applicable to courts-martial. The immediately preceding exception of 'cases arising in the land or naval forces' from the requirement of
an indictment abundantly shows that such cases were excepted from the other provisions." Cf. Grafton v. United States, 206 U. S.333 (1907). The Attorney General
has ruled that the provision applies, 9 Ops. Att'y Gen. 223, 230 (1858), as has the
Judge Advocate General, Naval Court-Martial Order 141-1918, p. 17.
11. The validity of the plea was not examined. Conceptually it is at least doubtful that acquittal of the crime of assault with intent to commit murder will necessarily
preclude prosecution for voluntary manslaughter. "The test is, whether, if what is
set out in the second indictment had been proved under the first, there could have
been a conviction; when there could, the second cannot be maintained.
1 BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAw § 1052, subd. 2 (9th ed. 1923).
12. The petitioner's guilt apparently was not in doubt. Instant case at 144-145.
13. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 328 (1937). "The tyranny of labels
• must not lead us to leap to a conclusion that a word which in one set of facts
may stand for oppression or enormity is of like effect in every other." Id. at 323. Cf.
Trono v. United States, 199 U. S.521 (1905).
14. See Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S.100,
134 (1894).
15. This is unlikely in view of the current tenor of opinion, reflected by recent
investigations into the military's administration of justice and by the proposed legislation for revision of the military judicial system, H. R. 2575, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1947). Moreover, "An individual does not cease to be a person within the protection of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution because he has joined the nation's
armed forces.
" United States v. Hiatt, 141 F. 2d 664, 666 (C. C. A. 3rd
1944).
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Constitutional Law-Selection of River Pilot Apprentices on
Family Basis as a Violation of the Equal Protection Clause-A
Louisiana statute,' regulating pilotage on the Mississippi below New
Orleans, empowered a board of commissioners, should a necessity for more
pilots exist, to examine those applicants who had served an apprenticeship
and to certify them to the governor for commissioning. Plaintiffs in this
case, a number of pilots previously engaged on unregulated shipping, were
virtually put out of work by an extension of the regulated area to include
the port of New Orleans. 2 Contending that the state pilots, organized as
an association, had consistently chosen members of their own families as
apprentices, plaintiffs asserted a denial -of equal protection of the laws and
sued for (1) declaratory judgment of the statute's unconstitutionality and
injunction of its enforcement, or (2) in the event of constitutionality, mandamus to the board to examine and certify them. The Supreme Court
affirmed the state courts' dismissal of the complaint : 3 equal protection does
not preclude a legislature from setting up apprenticeship requirements working on a family basis to effect exclusion from a properly regulated state
activity 4 if such classification is directly related to its objective. Kotch v.
Board of River Port Pilot Comnm'rs. for Port of New Orleans,67 Sup. Ct.
910 (1947).
A state's creation of lines of classification under its police power 5 is
subject to the availability of the broad constitutional guarantee of equal protection to strike out whatever exercise of state authority has become arbitrary." But the federal courts, loath to assume the responsibility of resolving matters of purely local policy, 7 have developed the rule of thumb
that any classification bearing a rational relation to a valid state objective
will not be extirpated by a judgment of unconstitutionality. Such a rationale, buttressing constitutionality, finds ready application when request is
made for a comprehensive declaration that the legislative judgment on the
face of a statute effects a prohibited discrimination. 9
But attack upon state action has met with more success when narrowly aimed at discriminatory enforcement of statutes valid on their face.
1. La. Acts 1908, No. 54, §§ 1-4; 6 LA. GEN. STAT. §4 9154-9157 (Dart, 1939).
2. La. Acts 1942, No. 134, § 2; 6 LA. GEN. STAT. § 9155 (Dart, Supp. 1947).
3. Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs. for Port of New Orleans, 209 La.
737, 25 So. 2d 527 (1946).
4. Throughout the argument it was conceded that pilotage regulation was a valid
exercise of the state's police power, Congress having at an early date set this activity
apart as a fit subject of state regulation until such times as Congress should act. Act
of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 9. § 4, REv. STAT. § 4235 (1875), 46 U. S. C. § 211 (1940). See
Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia, 12 How. 299, 315 et seq. (U. S.
1851).
5. Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. S. 141 (1940) ; New York ex rel. Lieberman v. Van
De Carr, 199 U. S. 552 (1905).
6. McFarland v. American Sugar Refining Co., 241 U. S. 79 (1916).
7. The cautionary attitude was expressed by Mr. Justice Holmes: "Obviously the
question . . . is one of local experience on which this court ought to be very slow
to declare that the state legislation was wrong on its facts ... . it is enough that this
court has no such knowledge of local conditions as to be able to say that it was manifestly wrong." Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138, 144 (1938).
8. Asbury Hospital v. Cass County, 326 U. S. 207 (1945) ; Ohio ex rel. Clarke
v. Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392 (1927); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S.
61 (1911).
9. E. f., Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U. S. 412 (1937);
Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U. S. 422 (1936).
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Though the necessity of distinguishing state from private action 'o has given
complexity to the problem," relief has been afforded by injunction of such

enforcement, 12 by reversal of criminal conviction, 13 by granting of habeas
corpus,"4 and by mandamus.' 5 In view of the breadth of the relief demanded in"the instant case and in the light of the fact that plaintiffs' quarrel
was primarily with the behavior of the private association of pilots, it seems
clear that plaintiffs were properly denied their prayer.16 But the Court
might well have placed this decision on the narrow basis (1) that the statute itself, as to apprenticeship provisions, 17 was fair on its face; (2) that
plaintiffs had not shown the statutorily required necessity for more pilots.' 8
The Court's reading of the statute as embodying the legislature's adoption
of the familial system, and the breadth of its approval of that system as a
valid exercise of state discretion seem, therefore, not to have been altogether necessary.
A classification based upon the accident of birth appears hardly to fit
into a democratic tradition, whether it be birth into a particular race or into
a particular family. The former having been consistently condemned without much desire on the part of the Court to find justification in some supposed local policy,' 9 the latter should receive condonation, if at all, only
upon a most compelling
showing of a not otherwise attainable, socially desir20
able objective.

10. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U. S. 1,
13 (1944) and cases cited therein dealing with determination of whether action of a
state official constitutes state action sufficient to confer jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment upon the federal courts.
11. The Louisiana court was impressed by the distinction between the public
character of the board and the private nature of the pilots association, and the fact
that the attacked discrimination was exercised by the latter. Kotch v. Board of River
Port Pilot Comm'rs. for Port of New Orleans, 209 La. 737, 756, 25 So. 2d 527, 533
(1946). Finding the statute itself constitutional, the court refused mandamus of the
scope requested since it would have required certification in complete disregard of the
statutory apprenticeship provision. Id. at 762, 25 So. 2d at 535.
12. Allston v. School Board of Norfolk, 112 F. 2d 992 (C. C. A. 4th 1940).
13. Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400 (1942) ; Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587 (1935).
14. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886).
15. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337 (1938). Mandamus in such
cases is not so directed, as in the instant case, as to attack the statute itself.
16. Under any reading of the prayer for relief, plaintiffs were requesting a declaration of the statute's inherent unconstitutionality: clearly, by request for declaratory
judgment and injunction; also, by request for mandamus which would require the
board to ignore the apprenticeship provision. See note 10 svfpra.
17. Such provisions are not peculiar to Louisiana, as a device employed by the
legislature to develop a trained pilotage corps. See PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 55, § 44
(Purdon, 1930).
18. Plaintiffs, thereafter, would still have had a possible remedy in the state court
through a-more finely-drawn prayer for relief designed to affect the particular discriminatory practices of the pilots association. A prayer for mandamus to compel the
board to adopt objective standards in accepting apprentices from the association, possibly by clearing prospective apprentices through the board, would at least be within
the bounds laid out by judicial approval of the statute's apprenticeship requirements as
such. See Note, Remedies for Discrimination by State and Local Administrative
Bodies, 60 HARv. L. REv. 271 (1946).
19. E. g., Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536 (1927).
20. See Mr. Justice Rutledge, dissenting in instant case at 916. Since the principal case reached the Supreme Court upon dismissal of the complaint, the Court relir.
heavily for its appraisal of the demands of an efficient pilotage system upon extensive
judicial notice of pilotage problems.

19471

RECENT CASES

Corporations-Effect of Breach of Stock Pooling Agreement on
Validity of Stockholders' Election-All the shares in a well-known
circus corporation were family owned, petitioner and defendant Haley
each holding 315, and another defendant, North, holding the remaining
370. Petitioner and Haley in 1941 executed a ten-year written agreement
to vote their shares together in all matters, any disagreement to be referred
for "arbitration" to Loos, an attorney, whose decision would be binding.
Until 1946 there were no disagreements and petitioner and Haley effectively controlled the corporation. In 1946, however, Haley opposed a director proposed by petitioner and the continuance as president of petitioner's son. North sided with Haley. When the arbiter decided in favor of
petitioner, Haley refused to vote accordingly. Haley and North then joined
forces, elected five out of seven directors, were thus able to install a new
slate of their own officers, and took over the running of the circus. Upon
petition to set the election aside, the Court of Chancery found the agreement valid and specifically enforceable, declared the 1946 election invalid,
ordered the defendants' candidates ousted, and directed a new stockholders'
election be held before a master.' The Supreme Court affirmed the validity
of the agreement but modified the decree in that the contested election itself
was held valid, but Haley's votes were not to be counted. Although this
left a deadlocked six man directorate, three each having been legally elected
by petitioner and North, the Court indicated the forthcoming annual election for 1947 might solve this dilemma.2 Ringling v. Ringling Bros.Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., 53 A. 2d 441 (Del. 1947).
While for most purposes courts will uphold pooling agreements in the
absence of fraud or illegal purpose,3 the alleged dogma is that such agreements will not be specifically enforced. 4 Authority for such a rule, however, is of doubtful origin, being derived from dictum, 5 and cases in which
the agreement either was itself totally invalid 6 or was a form of voting
agreement which expressly attempted to limit the directors in the independ1. Ringling v. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., 49 A. 2d
603 (Del. Ch. 1946).
2. The statement of facts includes additional material from the Transcript of
Record which, while not reported directly in the Supreme Court opinion, is thought
relevant.
3. Brightman v. Bates, 175 Mass. 105, 55 N. E. 809 (1900) (plaintiff who performed contractual services in organizing the pool allowed to recover compensation) ;
Smith v. San Francisco & N. P. Ry. Co., 115 Cal. 584, 47 Pac. 582 (1897) (directors'
election based upon votes cast in accordance with pooling agreement held valid in quo
warranto); 5 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2064 (perm. ed.
1931) ; Wormser, The Legality of Corporate Voting Trusts and Pooling Agreements,
18 COL. L. REv. 123-4 (1918). A pooling agreement, in which the stockholders merely
agree their stock will be voted together for certain broad purposes, should be distinguished from other types of voting agreements that seek to predetermine the specific
ways in which stock will be voted on particular matters. See note 7 infra.
4. Cases cited notes 5 and 6 infra; 5 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 3, § 2067. But
see Thompson v. J. D. Thompson Carnation Co., 279 Ill. 54, 61, 116 N. E. 648, 651
(1917). Since, however, the avowed object of a pooling agreement is to gain control,
it would appear that where there has been a breach damages would be of so speculative a nature that the agreement could have no practical significance except in terms
of specific enforceability. Contrast situation for a voting agreement, note 7 infra.
5. See Gage v. Fisher, 5 N. D. 297, 304, 65 N. W. 809, 811 (1895).
6. Roberts v. Whitson, 188 S. W. 2d 875 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) ; Gleason v.
Earles, 78 Wash. 491, 139 Pac. 213 (1914) ; Sullivan v. Parkes, 69 App. Div. 221, 74
N. Y. Supp. 787 (1st Dep't 1902).
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ent exercise of their judgment. 7 The courts tend to regard specific performance as impracticable,8 and have traditionally been reluctant to sanction
any separation of voting rights from ownership of stock which may result
in minority control.9 In the instant case the lower court faced this problem and boldly ordered specific performance.' 0 Such a holding was pregnant with the potential problems of practical enforcement 11 and the legal
consequences of de facto directorship1 2 At first glance, however, the Supreme Court would appear to have retreated from this position. By holding that the votes of the stockholder violating the pooling agreement were
invalid, the Court has accorded the agreement some legal effect; but by
failing affirmatively to direct these votes be cast in accordance with the
agreement the Court has taken the teeth out of the decree of specific performance. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that this was an equitable
proceeding, and the Court was evidently more concerned with settling this
particular dispute than in either reinforcing or rejecting a legal dogma. It
therefore rendered a decision advantageous to neither side, which, by its
deadlocking effect, obviously
would be an incentive for the parties to reach
3
a compromise agreement.'
7. McQuade v. Stoneham, 142 Misc. 842, 256 N. Y. Supp. 431 (Sup. Ct. 1932)
(agreement to have plaintiff elected director and treasurer at specific salary for indefinite period), af'd, 238 App. Div. 827, 262 N. Y. Supp. 966 (1st Dep't 1933), rev'd on
other grounds, 263 N. Y. 323, 189 N. E. 234 (1934) ; Haldeman v. Haldeman, 176 Ky.
635, 197 S. W. 376 (1917) (agreement to have plaintiff elected president) ; see Dulin
v. Pacific Wood & Coal Co., 103 Cal. 357, 364-5, 35 Pac. 1045, 1047 (1894). But distinguish Trefethen v. Amazeen, 93 N. H. 110, 36 A. 2d 266 (1944) (injunction granted
to Drevent breach of voting agreement) ; Clark v. Dodge, 269 N. Y. 410, 199 N. E.
641 (1936) (suit for specific performance of voting agreement allowed where parties
were sole stockholders). The specific provisions of voting agreements render them
more susceptible to an assessment of damages for breach (loss of salary, etc.) than
pooling agreements, and it is a general rule that equity will not step in when damages
are available. See 4 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1401 (Symons ed. 1941).
Also, most voting agreements are more objectionable to the courts than pooling agreements in that they attempt to control the votes of the directors in selecting the management as well as the votes of the stockholders in selecting directors. See Meck,
Employment of Corporate Executives by Majority Stockholders, 47 YALE L. J.

1079-80, 1083 (1938).
8. Compare McQuade v. Stoneham, 142 Misc. 842, 849-51, 256 N. Y. Supp. 431,
439-41 (Sup. Ct. 1932) (trial court) ; Rosenkrantz v. Chattahoochee Brick Co., 147
Ga. 730, 732, 95 S. E. 225, 226 (1918) ; Haldeman v. Haldeman, 176 Ky. 635, 651-2,
197 S. W. 376, 383-4 (1917). But distinguish Smith v. San Francisco & N. P. Ry.
Co., 115 Cal. 584, 47 Pac. 582 (1897).
9. See, e. g., Haldeman v. Haldeman, 176 Ky. 635, 649, 197 S. W. 376, 382 (1917);
Gleason v. Earles, 78 Wash. 491, 504, 139 Pac. 213, 218 (1914) ; Gage v. Fisher, 5 N.
D. 297, 303-8, 65 N. W. 809, 811-12 (1895). This was always the favorite argument
against the legality of any voting control device. See Wormser, supra note 3, at
123-4.
10. The Court of Chancery relied upon Clark v. Dodge, 269 N. Y. 410, 199 N. E.
641 (1936), which granted specific performance of a voting agreement wherein two
stockholders who owned all the stock agreed that the minority holder would manage
the business. This case, however, did not involve a pooling agreement, and can also
be distinguished from the instant case because the court reinstated the minority holder
as manager of the corporation on the theory that, since all the stockholders were parties to the agreement, there was no "damage threatened" to any other interests. See
11 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 117 (1936).
11. See note 8 supra.
12. See, in general, McWhirter v. Washington Royalties Co., 17 Del. Ch. 243, 152
Atl. 220 (1930) ; 2 FLETcHER, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 372-90.
13. Note the Court's comments, instant case, next to last paragraph. The Court's
opinion was handed down May 3, 1947. Subsequent events would seem to indicate
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Corporations-Inclusion of Unrealized Appreciation of Fixed
Assets in Surplus Available for Distribution to Shareholders-Defendants, former directors of plaintiff corporation, had authorized and
paid to themselves, as the only shareholders, $13,000 in dividends. The
surplus, on the basis of which the dividends were declared, depended on
the inclusion in the assets of $26,000 of unrealized appreciation of certain
fixed assets. The corporation, in a suit instituted by the present directors,
sought to recover under a statute which makes assenting directors jointly
and severally liable to the corporation for repayment of unlawful dividends.1 Because an asset denominated "franchise and promotion expense" was written off the books at the time of the reappraisal by the
directors, the trial judge found for the defendants on the ground that the
unrealized appreciation produced no increase in the aggregate of corporate assets over the aggregate of liabilities.2 On appeal, the Supreme
Court, in a unanimous opinion, reversed, holding that the rule prohibiting
the inclusion of unrealized appreciation of assets in a fund available for
dividends has been embodied as a categorical imperative in Pennsylvania
law. Berks BroadcastingCo. v. Craumer, et al., 356 Pa. 620, 52 A. 2d 571
(1947).
This decision, the first interpreting the unrealized appreciation phase
of Pennsylvania's Business Corporation Law of 1933, was not unexpected.3
Although it was thought that the approval by the New York court of the
current valuation of assets in Randall v. Bailey 4 would produce sweeping
changes in existing dividend law, 5 there has been little inclination to follow
that decision. 6 This may be due to the fact that such markups are considered poor accounting technique, 7 or that the highly solvent condition
of most corporations in the last seven years has obviated the practice. The
principal objection to the use of present worth of assets in determining
that the Court's expectation has been fulfilled.

At the annual stockholders' meet-

ing and election of directors for 1947, held June 20, the contestants apparently reached

a settlement whereby they agreed upon a compromise candidate for the disputed directorship and also decided that petitioner's son was to continue in a modified executive
capacity as first vice-president. Accordingly, petitioner and Haley finally cast their
votes together.

1. PA. STAT. AxN., tit. 15, § 2852-701 (Purdon, 1938), provides that no corporation shall pay dividends: "In cash or property, except from the surplus of the aggregate of its assets over the aggregate of its liabilities, including in the latter the amount
of its stated capital, after deducting from such aggregate of its assets the amount by
which such aggregate was increased by unrealized appreciation in value or revaluation of fixed assets, unless the amount thereof shall have been transferred to, or ineluded in, its stated capital." § 2852-707 provides for the liability of directors.
2. [Record, p. 84a.]
3. 54 HARv. L. REv. 505 (1941).
4. 23 N. Y. S. 2d 173 (1940), af'd, 288 N. Y. 280, 43 N. E. 2d 43 (1942), cited
by the trial court in the instant case in its opinion dismissing exceptions. [Record, p.
102a.]
5. Note, 50 YALE L. J. 306 (1940) ; 56 HaRv. L. Rav. 645 (1943) ; 89 U. op PA.
L. REv. 822 (1941).
6. It has been cited for the unrealized appreciation proposition only in Hayman
v. Morris, 36 N. Y. S. 2d 756, 768 (Sup. Ct. 1942) (inclusion by corporation of good
will valued at $1,000,000 in fund for purchase of its own stock held proper).
7. See 70 JOURNAL or AccOUNTANCy 564 (1940) ; as to the writing up of fixed
assets in quasi-reorganization, see Katz, Corporate Accounting Problems, 89 U. or
PA. L. REv. 764, 770 (1941).
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the fund available for dividends is that with the usual presumptions in
favor of directors' discretion, current valuation becomes little more than
directors' valuation.8 The expense of an impartial appraisal prior to each
dividend declaration, however, would be clearly prohibitive. As a partial
solution to the dilemma, one state allows the corporation to include in the
fund available for dividends the market value of all securities held by the
corporation, except its own.9 On the other hand, the effort to protect
the rights of creditors by the strict application of the statute, as in the
instant case, could conceivably lead to hardship on the shareholders. 0 In
spite of this, a statute similar to Pennsylvania's exists in eight other
states."
The court in the instant case suggests that the conflicting interests of creditors and shareholders can best be resolved by the declaration
of a share dividend.' 2 The shareholders thus realize the increment to
corporate holdings,' 3 while the creditors are protected by the addition of
the amount of the share dividend to stated capital. Except in California,
such a solution is available under all the statutes which require the reduction of assets by the amount of unrealized appreciation. In the absence
of an inexpensive, impartial appraisal board, the better result would seem
to be reached in decisions like the
instant one, and in the case law enunci4
ated before Randall v. Bailey.'

Inheritance Tax-Relinquishment of Support as Consideration
for Contract to Be Executed at Death-Prior to divorce, husband and
wife had entered into a separation agreement whereby the husband promised to give his wife one-quarter of his estate upon his death in addition to
a small monthly payment during his life, and the wife agreed not to sue for
more support. The husband died without making provision in his will for
his ex-wife, and she enforced the contract. The state sought to impose a
transfer inheritance tax on her acquisition of a share of the estate, but the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the transfer was not taxable be8. Note, 50 YAL. L. J. 306, 309 (1940).
9. MINN. STAT. § 7492-21 (Mason, Supp. 1940).
10. In Randall v. Bailey, e. g., the intrinsic value of the land in question had increased some 800%. To force a sale in order to "realize" the appreciation before the
shareholders profit by the increment would be, at best, unwieldy.
11. CALIF. Civ. CODE, Div. 1, c. 11, §346 (Deering, 1941); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 29-129(4a) (1932); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.41c (Smith-Hurd, 1935) ; IND.
STAT. ANN. § 25-211 (Burns, 1933); LA. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1106 (Dart, 1939);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.22 (Henderson, Supp. 1946) (but readjustments of previous
reductions in value are permissible and, semble, dividends to preferred shareholders
may be paid out of unrealized appreciation if the source is revealed) ; MINN. STAT.
§ 7492-21 (Mason, Supp. 1940) ; OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. § 8623-38 (Page, 1937).
12. Instant case at 626, 52 A. 2d at 575.
13. See GRAHAM AND KATZ, ACCOUNTING IN LAW PRACTICE 155 (2d ed. 1938),
where the authors suggest that while the book value of the new holdings remains constant, the market value is enhanced.
14. Southern California Home Builders v. Young, 45 Cal. App. 679, 188 Pac. 586
(1920) ; Kingston et al. v. Home Life Ins. Co. et al., 11 Del. Ch. 258, 101 At. 898
(1917), aff'd, 11 Del. Ch. 428, 104 Atl. 25 (1918) ; Jennery v. Olmstead, 36 Hun 536
(N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1885) ; Dealers' Granite Corp. v. Faubron, 18 S. W. 2d 737 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1929).
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cause it was made in return for an "adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth." In re Neller's Estate, 356 Pa. 628, 53 A. 2d
122 (1947).
The transfer falls within the language of § 1 of the Transfer Inheritance Tax Act, which imposes a tax on transfers "intended to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at or after death.":' § 2, however, provides that
in the determination of the taxable value of an estate, deductions are to be
made of "debts of the decedent . . . to the extent that they were contracted bona fide and for an adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth." 2 While the latter section might logically have been
interpreted as referring only to those "debts" which were not within the
scope of § 1,3 the weight of authority supports the view that it is not the
purpose of such statutes to tax those transfers designed to take effect at
death which
are supported by full consideration, but only those which are
4
gratuitous.
The dissent, however, emphasizes that relinquishment of a marital
right (such as the right to support) should not be construed as a "consideration in money or money's worth." 5 While treatment of the surrender
of some marital rights as a sufficient consideration might well serve as an
invitation to tax avoidance, 6 it is not therefore necessary to impose the tax
wherever the consideration for a transfer could be fitted into so broad a
classification as "relinquishment of marital rights." The surrender of support to which she is entitled is a calculable financial detriment to a wife
during her husband's lifetime, and a corresponding benefit to his estate. If
the instant case is viewed as precedent only where husband and wife are
actually separated, so that there will be no likelihood that the wife received
1. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 72, § 2301 (Purdon, 1946). "A tax . . . is . . . imposed upon the transfer of any property . . . (c) When the transfer is by deed,
grant, bargain, sale, or gift . . . intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment
at or after . . . death ..
2. PA.

STAT.

ANN., tit. 72, § 2302 (Purdon, 1946).

3. It could be contended that § 2 purports only to define the taxable value of property which is taxable under § 1, and not to change the scope of § 1. Furthermore, the
use of the words ". . . bargain, sale . . ."in § 1 (see note 1) might be regarded
as a deliberate inclusion of transfers for consideration. Cf. Estate of Oppenheimer, 75
Mont. 186, 243 Pac. 589 (1926).
4. See In re Hubbs, 41 Ariz. 466, 473, 19 P. 2d 672, 674 (1933). Where property
passes by will, however, the fact that the bequest is in fulfillment of a contract may
not be enough to exempt the transfer from tax. In re Howell, 255 N. Y. 211, 174
N. E. 457 (1931). Some courts reach this result only when the will transfers specific
property rather than money or a general share in the estate, on the theory that only
then does the will add anything to the contract. In re Johnson's Estate, 389 Ill. 425,
59 N. E. 2d 825 (1945). The "specific enforcement" of a contract to devise property
may also be subjected to the tax. Matter of Kidd, 188 N. Y. 274, 80 N. E. 924 (1907).
But cf. In re Vanderbilt's Estate, 102 Misc. 497, 169 N. Y. Supp. 201 (Surr. Ct. 1918),
1918), aff'd, 226 N. Y. 638, 123 N. E. 893 (1919).
5. The Federal Estate Tax Act provides that "relinguishment of dower . . . or of
any other marital rights in decedent's property . . . shall not be considered to any
extent a consideration 'in money or money's worth.'" INT. REv. CoDE § 812(b) (1946).
This provision, added in 1932, may have been merely a codification of existing interpretations. See Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U. S. 308, 312 (1945). It has been held to apply
to the relinquishment of the right to support. Helvering v. United States Trust Co.,
111 F. 2d 576 (C. C. A. 2d 1940).
6. For instance, the relinquishment of taxable dower rights should not make a
transfer at death a non-taxable payment of a "debt" of the estate. That such a result
would defeat the purpose of the statute was pointed out in People v. Estate of Field,
248 Ill. 147, 153, 93 N. E. 721, 723 (1910).
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7
support after giving up the right to it, an effective method for avoiding inmade available.
been
heritance taxation will not have

Patents-Legality of Price-Fixing Clause in License Agreements
Under Sherman Anti-Trust Act-Defendant patentee was indicted
under §§ 1-8 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act 1 for issuing a license under
his patent including a condition that the licensee would maintain prices
established by the defendant. The complaint was dismissed. Although
price-fixing agreements concerning competitive products in interstate commerce are illegal per se, on the authority of United States v. General
Electric Co. 2 a patentee is not subject to the provisions of the Anti-Trust
Act when his limitation of price is reasonably adopted to secure his reward
as patentee. United States v. Line Material Co., 64 F. Supp. 970 (E. D.
Wis. 1946), now before the Supreme Court.3
Beginning in 1917, the Supreme Court has steadily diminished the
rights conferred by the patent grant. 4 In its decisions accommodating the
patent laws to the basically opposed Anti-Trust Laws, the court has shown
an awareness of the changing economic pattern concentrating organized
research and patent ownership in corporations. 5 Congress, apparently,
has been satisfied with the balance maintained by the Court, for although
reforms have been pressed periodically, 6 no major revision has been made
in the patent laws since 1870. 7 The General Electric case had determined
7. Mossberg v. McLaughlin, 127 Conn. 48, 14 A. 2d 733 (1940).
1. 26

STAT.

209, §§ 1-8 (1890), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1-7 (1941).

2. 272 U. S. 476 (1926).
3. The U. S. Supreme Court noted jurisdiction at 67 Sup. Ct. 113 (1947) ; argument was heard April 29, 1947, 15 U. S. L. VEEx 3418 (1947); assigned for reargument at 67 Sup. Ct. 1528 (1947).
4. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co., 243 U. S.
502 (1917) (owner of patented machine can not use patent to control unpatented supplies used in machine) ; United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 258 U. S. 451
(1922) (patent-tying clause condemned) ; Carbice Corp. of America v. American
Patent Developments Corp., 283 U. S. 29 (1931) (patentee cannot sue supplier, of unpatented materials as infringer) ; United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U. S.
476 (1926) (fixing licensor's prices restricted to securing proper reward) ; Morton
Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U. S. 488 (1942) (equity will not entertain infringement suit by patentee using patent to control unpatented material) ; Mercoid
Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investing Co., 320 U. S. 661 (1944) (patentee cannot sue
supplier of unpatented device designed specially for use in patented machine for contributory infringement) ; Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 15 U. S. L.
WEEKx 4126 (1947) (licensee subject to price-fixing clause is free to challenge patent's
validity).
5. Barber Asphalt Corp. v. Leitch, 302 U. S. 458 (1938) ; Carbice Corp. of America v. American Patent Development Corp., 283 U. S. 29 (1931); Standard Oil v.
United States, 283 U. S. 163 (1931) ; Boston Store of Chicago v. American Graphophone Co., 246 U. S.8 (1917).
6. H. R. 20,388, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. (1908) ; H. R. 11,796, 61st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1909) ; H. R. 2930, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. (1912) ; H. R. 23,417, as amended, 62d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1912) ; H. R. 1700, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. (1913) ; H. R. 14,865, 63d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1914) ; S. 3410, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. (1922) ; S. 2783, 70th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1928); H. R. 9259, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. (1938); H. R. 9815, 75th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1938); S. 2491, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942).
7. 16

STAT.

201 (1870), 35 U. S. C. §§ 1-23 (1940).
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that a patentee who fixes reasonable prices at which the patented article
is sold by his licensee is excepted from indictment under the Anti-Trust
Laws. The Government now seeks to overrule that decision, contending8
that it was based upon a misconception of the function of the patent law,
Court which
and that it is not in accord with the modern doctrine of the
9
has re-emphasized the public nature of the patent grant. Plainly, the
Court is asked to replace the now emasculated "private property" 10 concept of the patent grant with the1 2"public franchise" 11 view; a reform which
had been rejected by Congress.
3
SigHistorically, a basis for this view exists in American law.'
nificantly, it would admit no exception to the Anti-Trust Laws in favor
14
of a patentee. The Court's recent rejection of compulsory licensing,
however, an equally necessary branch of the franchise concept, may indicate
an unwillingness to impose the policy recently rejected by the legislative
branch. This is no bar,' 5 however, since compulsory licensing bears strong
similarity to property confiscation, a potent defense not applicable in the
instant problem. Aside from the fundamental controversy concerning the
public nature of the patent grant, the ruling requested by the Government
is impractical under existing patent statutes, since the rule will, admittedly,
result in reduced licensing by patentees.' 6 The law affords no means of
preventing such suppression.l 7 Thus a situation now considered un8. The Government rationale: (1) The primary function of patent law is the public interest in advancement of arts and sciences. Reward to the inventor is secondary
and private. (2) The Anti-Trust Acts enunciate a general public policy under which
price-fixing is illegal per se. (3) The secondary consideration of reward to the inventor should be subordinate to the general policy of the Anti-Trust Acts, and, therefore, should preclude any price-fixing by the inventor. 15 U. S. L. WEEK 3418 (1947).
9. Katzinger v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 15 U. S. L. WEEK 4126 (1947) ; Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investing Co., 320 U. S. 661 (1944); United States v.
Masonite Corp., 316 U. S. 265 (1942) ; Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314
U. S.488 (1942).
10. The earlier patent decisions, see note 13 infra, treated the patent grant as
conditioned on continued use in the public interest. This concept, styled the "franchise
view," was supplanted by the "property" concept in Continental Paper Bag Co. v.
Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U. S.405 (1908), which held that the patentee's "property" interest privileged him to suppress the patent.
11. For a complete development of the consequences of these different concepts see
Meyers and Lewis, The Patent "Franchise," 30 GEo. L. J. 117 (1941). See note 10
supra.
12. The most recent critical examination of the Patent Laws was made by the
Temporary National Economics Committee. The Justice Department's major recommendations for reform were: (1) compulsory licensing, (2) unrestricted licenses (patentee not permitted to restrict license as to price, production, manner of use, or geographical area), (3) forfeiture of patent for violation of (1) or (2) above. T. N. E.
C. Final Report, pp. 36-37 (1941). None of these recommendations were enacted. See
note 6 supra.
13. United States v. Bell Telephone Co., 128 U. S. 315 (1888); Seymour v.
Osbourne, 11 Wall. 516 (U. S. 1870); Bloomer v. McQuewan, 14 How. 529 (U. S.

1852).

14. Hartford-Empire v. United States, 323 U. S.386 (1945). Compulsory licensing laws, commonly comprised in European patent laws, require a patentee to manufacture the patented article and/or grant licenses to all applicants at a reasonable
royalty.
15: Corn Products Refining Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n., 324 U. S.726 (1945);
Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S.331 (1940) ; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U. S.1 (1911).
16. 15 U. S. L. WEEr 3418 (1947).
17. Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U. S.405 (1908);
Heaton-Peninsular Button Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 Fed. 288 (C. C.
A. 6th 1896).
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favorable would be aggravated. Nor would the inability of the patentee
to offer price security encourage licensees to challenge the validity of
patents, thus freeing the economy from invalid grants.'8 The language of
the General Electric case, on the other hand, can be construed to restrict
price-fixing by the patentee whenever a court finds that there is an abuse
of the privilege. Evidence of a program of wide-spread industrial control
or unreasonable prices could be rebuked by a narrow application of the
rule asserting that the patentee had excdeded the normal and reasonable
means of securing his reward. Such modification of the General Electric
rule appears to be the only practical adjustment of the conflict unless the
Court is willing to undertake a part-by-part revision of the patent law by
judicial legislation with its resultant ambiguity and uncertainty.' 9

Search and Seizure-Effect of the Fourth Amendment Upon
Admissibility of Evidence Seized During Lawful Arrest for Unrelated Crime-Immediately following his arrest on two warrants duly
issued charging violation of the Mail Fraud Statute' and the National
Stolen Property Act,2 FBI agents searched petitioner's apartment, expressing as their objective two stolen checks and any means used to commit the
thefts. After five hours of thorough searching they discovered, in a sealed
envelope marked "personal papers," classification cards and registration certificates possessed in violation of the Selective Training and Service Act of
1940.3 Petitioner, indicted on charges arising out of this unlawful possession, moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that it was obtained
contrary to the "reasonable search and seizure" provisions of the Fourth
Amendment and consequently inadmissible under the Fifth. This motion
was denied and he was convicted. The circuit court affirmed the conviction 4 and the Supreme Court, in a five to four decision containing three
separate dissenting opinions, upheld the circuit court, holding that the
search and seizure were not unreasonable, but properly incident to a lawful
arrest. Harrisv. United States, 67 Sup. Ct. 1098 (1947).
The federal rule on the inadmissibility of evidence obtained contrary to
the "reasonable search and seizure" provisions of the Fourth Amendment 5
18. The Government had contended that it would. But challenging the validity
of a patent involves expensive research. Under present practice licenses are often
taken under narrow and possibly invalid patents when to do so would be more economical than challenging the validity. Affording more opportunity to challenge would
not reduce the cost. On the other hand, valuable patents licensed for large sums are
invariably subjected to research, very often covering examination of major scientific
libraries in every country in the world. In the instant case note the extent of effort
to invalidate made by Westinghouse. Instant case at 974 and 977.
19. One member, at least, is willing. Justice Douglas, dissenting, in Special
Equipment Co. v. Coe, 65 Sup. Ct. 741 (1945), states: "We should not pass on to
Congress the duty to remove the private perquisites which we have engrafted on the
patent laws. This Court was responsible for the creation. This Court should take
the responsibility for the removal."
1. 35 STAT. 1130 (1909), 18 U. S. C. §338 (1940).
2. 53 STAT. 1178 (1939), 18 U. S.C.§415 (1940).
3.54 STAT. 885, 894-5, 50 U. S. C. App. § 311 (1940).
4. 151 F. 2d 837 (C. C. A. 10th '1945), 30 MiNN. L. REv. 207 (1946).
5. The Fourth Amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
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strikes a balance between maximum law enforcement efficiency on the one
hand and a maximum of libertarian guarantees on the other. In effect, it
modifies the usual dogma that courts will not stop to inquire into the
source of evidence. 6 The libertarian ideal has developed in the Court's outlining of the concept of reasonableness. 7 In this light, the right to search
that is a recognized incident of lawful arrest 8 was originally limited to the
place or premises in the immediate possession and control of the person
arrested. 9 Later decisions proscribed general exploratory searches for evidence of crime and strongly suggested that the authority to search on
arrest be no greater than that conferred by a particularizing search warrant.' 0 In the instant case the Court followed the established distinction
between exploratory searches and searches having as objectives "the fruits
or instrumentalities of the crime for which the arrest is made," 11 conclud12
ing that anything found in the latter type of search may lawfully be seized.
Thus since the thoroughness of the search alone is apparently not to be regarded as the basic criterion of its legality, the distinction may prove to be
a precarious one, especially since the only solution that the Court could offer
for this problem was to put its reliance on the "good faith" of the arresting
officers. 13 In the Davis and Zap cases, the Court had already indicated a
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported

by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized." The Fifth Amendment provides: "No person . . .
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, . . ." The

interaction of the Fourth with the Fifth Amendment was first postulated in Boyd v.
United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886), and established in Weeks v. United States, 232
U. S. 383 (1914). See also Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385
(1920) ; Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298 (1921).
6. 8 WIGMoRE, EviDENcE § 2183 (3d ed. 1940). Commonwealth v. Dana, 2 Metc.
329 (Mass. 1841). Though the Court as yet evaded a direct contest of the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to the States, it has clearly intimated that it does
not apply. See National Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 232 U. S. 58, 71 (1914) ; Byars
v. United States, 273 U. S. 28, 32 (1927) ; Wheatley v. United States, 159 F. 2d 599,
601 (C. C. A. 4th 1946).
7. For an interesting study of the Amendment in its historical setting see Lasson,
The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution in 55 JoHiNs HopKINs UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN HISTRCA. AND PoLrrIcAl,
SCIENCE (1937). See the useful tabular analysis of the Court's decisions in the appendLx to the instant case at p. 1121 et seq.
8. Dillon v. O'Brien, 20 Ir. L. R. 300, 16 Cox Crim. Cas. 245 (Ex. 1887).
9. Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914) ; Agnello v. United States, 269
U. S. 20 (1925). In Marron v. United States, 275 U. S. 192 (1927), the search of
the premises apparently extended beyond the "immediate possession and control" limitation, besides being close to exploratory in nature, but the Court limited the holding
in that case to its particular facts and clarified its scope in Go-Bart Importing Co. v.
United States, 282 U. S. 344, 358 (1931). See also United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16
F. 2d 202 (C. C. A. 2d 1926).
10. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344 (1931) ; United States
v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452 (1932). A distinction is made in the case of searches
searches made in the course of transportation. Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132
(1925). For a historical survey of United States statutes authorizing the issuance of
search warrants see appendix to Davis v. United States, 328 U. S. 582, 603-4 (1946).
11. Marron v. United States, 275 U. S. 192 (1927) ; Agnello v. United States, 269
U. S. 20, 30 (1925).
12. United States v. Lindenfeld, 142 F. 2d 829 (C. C. A. 2d 1944) ; Matthews v.
Correa, 135 F. 2d 534 (C. C. A. 2d 1943) ; Shelton v. United States, 50 F. 2d 405
(C. C. A. 7th 1931). But see In re Ginsburg, 147 F. 2d 749, 751 (C. C. A. 2d 1945).
13. The Court also relied on several dicta to the effect that a search for stolen
goods is privileged on arrest. See, e. g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 623
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tendency to narrow its prior liberal interpretations of the Fourth Amendment. 14 In the instant case, the potential dangers of continuing such a
trend, with its possible effect of endowing the arresting officer with magisterial discretion, were eloquently set forth in the dissenting opinions. 15
That the class of persons who might need to invoke the Amendment's protection may suddenly be expanded is illustrated by the numerous appeals
to it in prosecutions under the National Prohibition Act.16 With the possibility being not too remote that the law will reach out and embrace a new
category of political offenses, 17 the Court should be less willing than it seems
to narrow its prior interpretations of the Amendment in such fashion.

Torts-Effect of Plaintiff's Wanton Misconduct in a Last Clear
Chance Situation-Plaintiff, standing in the center of an intersection,
between the tracks of an east-west trolley line, raised his hands to warn a
street car, 400 feet away, of the approach of a fire engine coming south
towards the intersection. When the trolley was at least seventy-five feet
away, plaintiff, seen by the motorman, turned around in order to wave the
fire engine on. Defendant's trolley struck and injured the plaintiff who
had been unaware of his peril. In an action based on defendant's wanton
misconduct the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff. Judgment n. o. v. for defendant was sustained on appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court which
held:' that (1) plaintiff was guilty of wanton misconduct, and (2) plaintiff's wantonness bars recovery in an action based on defendant's wanton
misconduct. Elliott v. Philadelphia TransportationCo., 53 A. 2d 81 (Pa.

1947).
(1886). It also used the makeweight argument that a crime had been committed in
the very presence of the agents conducting the search, which, though useful in distinguishing the Marron case, as applied to the facts of the instant case was expressly
rejected by the prosecution. [Brief for United States, pp. 38, 39.] See also dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, instant case at p. 1110.
14. D;is-v. United States, 328 U. S. 582 (1946) (distinction between public and
private papers)"; Zap v. United States, 328 U. S. 624 (1946) (waiver of the Amendment's protection). For a critique of these decisions see Hendrix, Recent United
States Supreme Court Interpretationsof the Law of Searches and Seizures, 37 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 413 (1947). See also Note, 35 Guo. L. J. 92 (1946) and Comment,
45 Mica. L. REv. 605 (1947). In general see Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and
Seizures, 34 HARv. L. Rav. 361 (1921).
15. Dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Murphy, instant case at p. 1117, and of Mr.
Justice Jackson, at p. 1119.
16. 41 STAT. 305, 315 (1919). See Waite, Reasonable Search and Research, 86
U. oF PA. L. REv. 623, 626 (1938). Under Prohibition some state courts adopted the
federal rule. People v. Marxhausen, 204 Mich. 559, 171 N. W. 557 (1919). For a
recent state decision embodying the rule see Shuck v. State, 223 Ind. 155, 59 N. E. 2d
124 (1945).
17.

".

. . Nor should we forget that what seems fair enough against a squalid

huckster of bad liquor may take on a very different face, if used by a government determined to suppress political opposition under the guise of sedition." Judge Learned
Hand in United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F. 2d 202, 203 (C. C. A. 2d 1926).
1. Mr. Justice Allen Stearne dissented, holding, as did the Superior Court, 160 Pa.
Super. 291, 50 A. 2d 537 (1947), that the question of plaintiff's "wantonness" is properly for the jury.
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When in the 1943 case of Kasanovich v. George2 recovery was
allowed against a defendant who, having observed the negligent plaintiff's
position of peril, did not exercise the ordinary care which would have
avoided the accident, the road was opened for that phase of "last clear
chance" known as the doctrine of "discovered peril" 3 to make its way into
the tort law of Pennsylvania. There the court was prevented by precedent 4
and legislative inertia 5 from expressly applying the principles of that doctrine. Instead the concept of "wanton misconduct" was employed to describe the defendant's conduct and the principle was announced that contributory negligence was no bar to recovery against a "wanton" defendant. 6 But in the instant case by finding the plaintiff "wanton" when he
is in just that situation encompassed by the doctrine of last clear chance 7
and by subscribing to the dogma that a wanton plaintiff is barred from recovering against a wanton defendant,8 the court emphatically reiterates
Pennsylvania's traditional rejection of that doctrine, long the law in most
jurisdictions, which is designed to alleviate some of the harshness resulting
from undiscriminating application of in pari delicto principles. 9
The Restatement of Torts, upon which the court relied for its proposition, did not intend an emasculation of its sections on last clear chance 10
(under which the instant plaintiff would have recovered)" by the application of a "wanton misconduct" principle found in another, unrelated section. 12 Moreover, most courts, even though verbally in accord with the
proposition announced in this case, make no inquiry into the degree or kind
of fault attributable to the plaintiff where his peril has been discovered. 13
2. 348 Pa. 199, 34 A. 2d 523 (1943), 48 DIcx. L. REv. 197 (1944); accord,

Mesorki v. Pennsylvania R. R., 348 Pa. 204, 34 A. 2d 526 (1943).
3. HARPER, LAW OF TORTS 304 (1938).
4. Rose v. Quaker City Cab Co., 69 Pa. Super. 208 (1918) ; see Kasanovich v.
George, 348 Pa. 199, 202, 34 A. 2d 523, 525 (1943) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS, PA. ANNOT.
§479 (1938).

5. House Bill No. 604, proposed in the 1943 session of the Pennsylvania legislature, would have provided a rule of comparative negligence; it was never enacted. See
Nqte, 17 TEMP. L. Q. 276 (1943).
6. See I(asanovich v. George, 348 Pa. 199, 203, 34 A. 2d 523, 525 (1943) ; 2 RESTATEMENT, TORTS, §

482(1) (1934).

7. See 2 RESTATEMENT, TORTS, §§ 479, 480 (1934). The leading case in the field
of "last clear chance" is Davies v. Mann, 10 M. & W. 546, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (1842).
8. Instant case at 83.

9. See

ELDREDGE, MODERN TORT PROBLEMS

237 (1941) ; PROSSER,

LAW OF TORTS

408 (1941).

10. 2

RESTATEMENT, TORTS

§§ 479, 480 (1934).

11. See 2 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 480 (1934). The instant case meets the requirements of section 480 in that defendant, at the time plaintiff's peril was observed, could
have stopped the trolley in time to avoid injuring the plaintiff who was unaware of
his peril. See also PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 9 at 413; HARPER, op. cit. supra note 3
at 307.
12. 2 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 482(2) (1934). "Wanton misconduct" was defined
in conformity with the language of the section by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Kasanovich v. George, 348 Pa. 199, 204, 34 A. 2d 523, 526 (1943).
13. California, for example, applied the dogma of the instant case in an automobile
guest-host situation, Price v. Schroeder, 35 Cal. App. 2d 700, 96 P. 2d 949 (1939), but
in holding for the plaintiff in a last clear chance situation the court said: "A defend-
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They, like the Restatement, recognize such situations as sui generis and so
treat them.1 4 Pennsylvania does not recognize the problem of the instant
case as one requiring a unique solution, 15 but rather describes the conduct
of the parties as "wanton," a "weasel word" used in many situations which
are capable of factual distinction and varying treatment. 16
By finding the plaintiff "wanton" as a matter of law in the instant case,
whereas in the past in all but the clearest-cut case the question of mere ordinary contributory negligence has been left to the jury, 17 and by holding
"wantonness" a bar to recovery against one in the position of the instant
defendant (capable of avoiding the accident after discovering the plaintiff's
peril) the hope raised by the Kasatozich case of achieving by judicial decision at least one phase of "last clear chance" is gone.' 8 If there is to be a
ant is never relieved of liability if he has it in his power to prevent the injury.
If he has the opportunity of avoiding the injury, he must at his peril exercise it .
the . . . doctrine

. . . is humane in its nature."

Girdner v. Union Oil Co., 216

Cal. 197, 203, 13 P. 2d 915, 918 (1932). In Waynick v. Walrond, 155 Va. 400,
154 S. E. 522 (1930), a case involving a non last clear chance situation, the court indicated (p. 411) it might adopt the dogma of the instant case, whereas in a last clear
chance case, Roaring Fork R. R. v. Ledford's Adm'r., 126 Va. 97, 101 S. E. 141
(1919), the same court said (p. 144) : ".

.

. however great may have been the neg-

ligence of the deceased, the defendant owed to him, under the humane doctrine of the
last clear chance, the duty . . . to exercise ordinary care to avoid injuring
him.
14. Note the plea made for recognition of last clear chance situations as unique
and for treatment in accord with the principles of the "discovered peril" doctrine in
Note, 24 MINN. L. Rav. 81, 101 (1939). It is there noted that a doctrine based on
concepts of "wanton and willful" fails to give effect to the public policy underlying
the last clear chance doctrine. Alabama apparently is the only state which uses the
concept "wanton" to grant recovery to a negligent plaintiff in a last clear chance situation and in addition expressly states that a plaintiff's "wantonness" will not bar recovery. Central of Georgia R. R. v. Partridge, 136 Ala. 587, 34 So. 927 (1902). See
41 A. L. R. 1379, 1382-1383.
15. See Note, Those Weasel Words--"Willful and Wanton," 92 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 431 (1944).
16. South Carolina and Minnesota, as well as Pennsylvania, reject "last clear
chance" and subscribe to the proposition of the instant case, holding plaintiff's wanton
misconduct a bar to recovery in last clear chance situations as in others. See Spillers
v. Griffin, 109 S.C. 78, 95 S.E. 133 (1917) ; Hinde v. Minneapolis, A. & C. Ry. Co.,
162 Minn. 112, 202 N. W. 340 (1925). The history of "last clear chance" in Minnesota and that state's failure to recognize the problem as sui generis closely parallels
the situation in Pennsylvania. Compare Sloniker v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 76 Minn.
306, 79 N. W. 168 (1899) with Kasanovich v. George, 348 Pa. 199, 34 A. 2d 523
(1943) ; compare Note, 8 MINN. L. REv. 329 (1924) with Note, 92 U. OF PA. L. REv.

431, 444 (1944) ; compare Hinkle v. Minneapolis, A. & C. Ry., 162 Minn. 112, 202 N.
W. 340 (1925) (usually regarded as a last clear chance situation, though the reported
facts are not clear) with instant case.
17. Van Note v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 353 Pa. 277, 45 A. 2d 71 (1945);
McPherson v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 85 Pa. Super. 275 (1925) ; see Cox v.
Scarazzo, 353 Pa. 15, 17, 44 A. 2d 294, 295 (1945). But see Southern Ry. Co. v. Carroll, 138 Fed. 638 (C. C. A. 4th 1905). In Schubring v. Weggen, 234 Wis. 517, 219
N. W. 788 (1940), plaintiff-guest was held, as a matter of law, to have assumed the
risk of defendant-host's negligent driving. The court in the instant case cited the
Schubring case as authority for holding plaintiff wanton as a matter of law despite
the Wisconsin court's caveat that its doctrine of assumption of risk ".

. . does not

apply except in cases of guest against host." To the effect that there is a discernible
public policy against permitting auto guests to recover from their hosts, see SH:UL~lqA
AND JAMES, CASES ON ToRTs 709 (1942).
18. Query the result in the Kasanovich case if defendant's counsel had raised the
issue of plaintiff's "wantonness." See Elliott v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 160
Pa. Super. 291, 293, 50 A. 2d 537, 538 (1947).

1947]

RECENT CASES

133

relaxation of the doctrine of contributory fault in Pennsylvania and substitution for 9it of a doctrine of comparative fault, legislative action will be
necessary.'

19. See ELDREDGE, op. cit. supra note 9 at 237; 92 U. oF PA. L. REv. 431, 445
(1944). For an interesting discussion of the Wisconsin comparative negligence statute,
Wis. STAT. 9, §331.045 (1943), in operation, see 27 MARQ. L. REv. 219 (1943), especially as to the respective functions of judge and jury.

